Hezbullah, Iran and the IRA

My response to a very interesting article by Steven Simon and Jonathon Stevenson about the possibilities of disarming Hezbollah.

First of all, although the comparisons to the IRA are obviously limited, I think that the similarities are worth noting and the differences were clearly explained by Simon and Stevenson.

I definitely agree that due to the chances of, and danger of Obama getting burned by Hezbollah breaking a public deal, things should be kept back channel.

I am not really sure how the British expect to achieve much in Lebanon. Traditionally, the French due to their former imperial role in greater Syria and to their implicit protectorate over Lebanese Maronites, have long yielded a strong influence in Lebanon/Syria and I am surprised they are not mentioned as a potential role player.

The two main questions that come to mind for me are actually a bit connected

1) The first is whether or not Hezbollah is truly trying to or capable of separating itself from Iranian influence. It is well documented that many Hezbollah operatives trained in Iran and revolutionary guard officers were even involved directly in the fighting in the last Lebanon war. I do think that Hezbollah's rise in prominence has shown them that they can make gains via the political arena, but I question how willing the Iranians are to give up their proxy power in the Levant. It is important to remember, it is not only the weapons that buys them influence, but the money that is used to fund Hezbollah's social programs that has bought them influence over Lebanese Shiites. Without Iranian $$s and forced to contend with the other political factions in securing money and services for their supporters via government channels, I think Hezbollah's power at the polls would drop significantly.

2) "In fact, to maximize Hezbollah's incentives to move forward, it would make sense to explore whether Israel would in principle agree to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms and refrain from attacking Lebanon if Hezbollah submitted to a decommissioning process. "

The argument that Hezbollah would give up its arms if Israel withdrew from the Shebaa Farms is ludicrous. First of all, a UN commission has ruled that the Shebaa farms are actually Syrian, so Hezbollah's argument that they need arms to liberate it for Lebanon is unfounded and a ploy to "legitimize" the resistance. Secondly, Israel wants nothing more then quiet on the northern border. Without provocation, the chances of an Israeli attack are virtually non existent. The whole Shebaa Farms argument is a farce propagated by Hezbollah to sanction its position as a "resistance" organization. It is also a joke to give any credence to the UN forces (UNIFIL) that are deployed in Southern Lebanon to theoretically enforce UN Resolution 1701  prevent a renewal of hostilities. They should be sent somewhere more useful then doing nothing while Hezbollah amasses 40,000 rockets south of the Litani river (the supposed demilitarized zone).

Those issues aside. I am obviously in favor of disarming Hezbollah and applaud Stevenson and Simons for their in depth analysis and ideas. I think that back channel negotiations should be pursued to try and demilitarize Hezbollah, sever the Iranian influence over the Lebanese state. The possible implications of participation in government contributing to the de-radicalization of Hezbollah should not be discounted, however, it is a long and hard road to turn a terrorist organization that runs a de facto sub state into a political party. 

It should also be noted, that since Hezbollah joined the Lebanese government, Israeli officials have made it be known that they consider any attack by Hezbollah to be an attack by the country of Lebanon. They have also hinted that in a future conflict they will even hold Hezbollah's Syrian sponsors responsible. In the end, like the IRA, the only hopes of a true disarmament, is that Hezbollah becomes moderated by their role in governance and thus their actions are held to the standards of a sovereign nation.